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Abstract—Nowadays, the growth of advanced technologies is
paving the way for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and making
them more efficient and smarter. However, this makes ICS more
connected to communication networks that provide a potential
platform for attackers to intrude into the systems and cause
damage and catastrophic consequences. In this paper, we propose
implementing digital twins that have been equipped with an
intrusion detection algorithm. Our novel algorithm is able to
detect attacks in a timely manner and also diagnose the type of
attack by classification of different types of attacks. With digital
twins, which are a new concept in ICS, we have virtual replicas
of physical systems so that they precisely mirror the internal
behavior of the physical systems. So by placing the intrusion
detection algorithm in digital twins, security tests can be done
remotely without risking negative impacts on live systems.
Index Terms—Intrusion detection, Digital twins, Industrial
control systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, smart manufacturing has attracted much attention
[1], and the growth of Internet-of-things (IoT) and cloud
computing are paving the way for the smart factories that
will realize Industry 4.0. As part of Industry 4.0, Industrial
Control Systems (ICS), which consists of combinations of
control components that act together to achieve an industrial
objective, are becoming connected and part of the networked
systems in the factory. Although, networked ICSs increase the
efficiency of the systems, they may jeopardize the system’s
security at the same time, since they can provide a critical
platform through which attackers may be able to intrude into
the system.
Some examples of recent cyber attacks that targeted ICSs
are the Stuxnet computer worm attacks on Iran’s nuclear
installation in 2010 [2], BlackEnergy malware attack on the
Ukrainian power grid in 2015 [3], HatMan malware attack on
critical infrastructure using Schneider Electrics Safety Instru-
mented Systems in 2017 [4], malware attack on 40 percent of
all ICS in energy organizations protected by Kaspersky Lab so-
lutions in 2017 [5], and the cyber attacks on three U.S. natural
gas pipeline companies in 2018 [6]. These attacks demonstrate
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security weaknesses and the necessity for appropriate security
measures to protect ICS infrastructure.
According to this significant increase in cyber attacks, much
attention has been paid to intrusion detection in ICS over the
recent years.
Digital twin is a rather new concept in industry. With digital
twins, we have virtual replicas of physical systems so that
they precisely mirror the internal behavior of the physical
systems [7]. So using this virtual environment for security
tests instead of the real system prevents any interference with
the live systems.
Hence, in this paper, we propose a digital twin based
intrusion detection technique due to a couple of reasons. First,
applying security tests may have some negative effects on the
live systems and cause to reduce the efficiency of the systems.
Also, an intrusion detection system in the digital domain can
include methods that require much more computing resources
than if deployed in the real system. For instance, machine
learning techniques usually are hard to realise in the physical
domain, where there often are embedded devices with limited
computing power and more restrictive programming models.
There are a few papers that have suggested intrusion de-
tection as a use case for digital twins. To the best of our
knowledge, so far, only two papers have been published
that show how the concept of digital twins can be used to
implement intrusion detection systems. Authors in [8], defined
two rules, namely, safety and security rules, that specific
digital twins must adhere to. However, this research missed the
synchronization between digital twins and the real systems. So
real systems’ data is not incorporated into the implemented
intrusion detection. Moreover, the proposed rules are very
limited as an intrusion detection method for detecting cyber
attacks. Regarding these issues, authors in [9] proposed a
passive state replication to create synchronization between
physical systems and digital twins that is a fundamental
requirement for realizing the intrusion detection using digi-
tal twins. However, this synchronization method only copy
some limited data of physical system to digital twin and it
does not make the digital twin able to follow the physical
system continuously for instance, when there are unexpected
changes in the physical system. Further, the authors proposed
a behavior-specification-based intrusion detection to determine
whether the system’s behavior during runtime diverges from
the predefined correct behavior due to an intrusion. However,
creating the specification of the system’s correct behavior
typically requires processing effort, whereas in this paper the
authors sidestep this issue by making the assumption that the
specification of the system is readily available.
Motivated by synchronization challenges in digital twins, in
our prior work [10] we proposed an architecture to implement
a digital twin that makes it able to follow its physical counter-
part’s behavior continuously and guarantees synchronization
between digital twins and physical systems. In this paper,
we equip this architecture with a novel intrusion detection
algorithm that unlike [9] does not need a specification of the
system’s correct behavior. We demonstrate how the digital
twin concept can be used for intrusion detection. Further,
we develop a novel algorithm in the digital twin for timely
detection of attacks on ICS. Also, we propose an approach to
diagnose the type of attack after detecting it by classification of
different types of attacks. Finally, we evaluate the capability of
the proposed anomaly detection algorithm through simulation
studies.
II. TARGETED SYSTEM
The targeted system, which concerns industrial control sys-
tems, is illustrated in Fig. 1. In this figure, the physical domain
shows an industrial system, which is composed of several
different control systems. These control systems can represent
a factory where there are different kinds of machines and
robots. A digital twin for the system is deployed in the cloud
using the architecture in our prior work [10]. There will always
be a network between the physical domain and the cloud, and
also there can be a network between the components of a
control system inside the physical domain. These networks
create the possibility of cyber attacks on the signals that are
sent through them.
In this paper, as Fig. 1 shows, an intrusion detection system
is deployed in the digital twin in order to detect cyber attacks
on the real system. Also, we consider attacks that intrude into
the network and try to manipulate the measurement signal y
in order to drive the system to an unsafe state.
We consider two Scaling and Ramp attacks in which the
attacker inject false data into the signal and modify it. Ac-
cording to [11], [12] and [13], we can model these attacks as
follows:
• Scaling attack: In this type of attack, the measurement
signal is manipulated and its value depending on the
amount of scaling attack parameter λs, is converted to
a value greater or less than the actual value:
y∗(t) =
{
y(t) for t /∈ τa
(1 + λs) · y(t) for t ∈ τa (1)
where τa indicates the attack period.
• Ramp attack: In this type of attack, since the beginning
of the attack, λr.t is added to the actual signal and
depending on the amount of λr, increases or decreases
the value of the signal:
y∗(t) =
{
y(t) for t /∈ τa
y(t) + λr.t for t ∈ τa (2)
Fig. 1. Targeted system overview.
Since different attacks can have different effects on the
system, different mitigation methods may be needed to deal
with them. Therefore, after detecting the attack, it is also
important to classify the attack in order to choose the best
mitigation method for it. Hence, in next section, we explain
our proposed method to detect these attacks in a timely manner
and classify them.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this paper, we propose a novel intrusion detection, and we
also propose to apply this intrusion detection to digital twins
instead of the real system. Our proposed solution consists of
two parts: attack detection and attack classification.
A. Attack Detection
In order to detect an attack on the system, we propose to
use a Kalman filter [14] to estimate the correct signals in the
system. The Kalman filter uses input and output signals of
the system to estimate the correct output of the system. This
means that the Kalman filter optimally removes the destructive
effects of the attack and noises from the manipulated signal
and can estimate the correct behavior of the system. This
estimated signal can then be used to detect the occurrence
of the attack. In order to design a Kalman filter, first, an
observable state-space model of the system is needed. The
Kalman filter will be placed in the digital twin, and as the
digital twin is created based on [10], we can assume that
there exists a simulated model of the real system that has been
obtained easily by system identification algorithms. Therefore,
it is only necessary to create an observable realization of this
model to generate an observable state-space model.
After designing the Kalman filter, input and output signals
of the system, which, the Kalman filter has been designed for,
should be sent to the Kalman filter to estimate the correct
output signal.
By considering process noise and measurement noise in the
system, our targeted system can be modelled as follows:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk +Gwk w → N(0, Q)
yk = Cxk + Fvk v → N(0, R) (3)
In this model x is the state vector, y is the output signal which
is measured by sensors, u is the input signal which is generated
by the controller, w is process noise, v is measurement
noise and subscript k shows time instance. Here, we consider
process noise and measurement noise to be white noise with
covariances Q and R respectively. Also, A, B, C, G, and F
are coefficient matrices.
A Kalman filter for this system will be designed using the
following recursive algorithm, which consists of two parts:
time update and measurement update [14]. The time update
part consists of the following steps:
1) xˆk|k−1 = Akxˆk−1k−1 +Bkuk (4)
2) Pk|k−1 = Gk−1Qk−1GTk−1 +Ak−1Pk−1|k−1A
T
k−1
(5)
and the measurement update part consists of following steps:
3) Kk = Pk|k−1CTk
(
CkPk|k−1CTk + FkRkF
T
k
)−1 (6)
4) xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 +Kk
(
yk − Ckxˆk|k−1
)
(7)
5) Pk|k = (I −KkCk)Pk|k−1 (8)
where xˆ is the estimated state vector, P is the estimating
covariance matrix and K is the Kalman gain.
However, one problem of a Kalman filter is that it requires
some characteristics of the noise. Q and R are the covariance
matrices of process and measurement noises, respectively,
and these are usually not known. To overcome this problem,
inspired by the proposed method in [15], we propose a particle
swarm optimization (PSO) and combine this with the Kalman
filter. In this method, first, in offline mode using a combination
of PSO and the Kalman filter, the optimal values of Q and R
can be found. Then, these obtained values are injected into the
Kalman filter for estimation in online mode.
Using this Kalman filter, state variables of the system are
estimated. The system’s output can also be estimated based on
these state variables and using the system model as follows:
yˆk = Cxˆk (9)
Now by comparing the estimated signal yˆk with the output
signal y˜k, which is virtual version of the measurement signal
y and regenerated by the digital twin and exactly follows y,
the residual signal is generated:
rk = y˜k − yˆk (10)
In order to distinguish attacks from noises and detect the
occurrence of an attack, it is necessary to use a detector.
Actually, the detector helps to make the effects of attacks
and noises on the signal more prominent and filter impacts
of noises and prevent false alarms. Our detector uses residual
signal r and generates h so as to detect attacks as follows:
hk = sup
k−k0<i<k
|ri|,
{
H0 : if hk ≤ threshold
H1 : if hk > threshold
(11)
where the hypothesis H0 indicates the normal operation of the
system and H1 indicates the abnormal mode of the system.
Since the Kalman filter cannot distinguish the changes
caused by the attack from the changes due to the presence
of the noise, a threshold for filtering the effects of noise and
preventing false alarms should be considered. Based on 68-
95-99.7 rule, in a Gaussian distribution, 68.27%, 95.45%, and
99.73% of the values lie within one, two, and three standard
deviations of the mean, respectively. Since the noise in this
paper is assumed to be Gaussian noise with zero mean, by
considering a threshold equal to 3σ, where σ, is the standard
deviation of the measurement noise, 99.73% false alarms that
may occur due to this noise can be filtered out.
B. Attack Classification
The goal of the classification is to categorize data into
distinct classes. Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a machine
learning approach used for classification, and in this approach,
a model is generated based on training data and then it can
be used to predict the class of new data. SVM supports both
binary classification and multi classification. In this paper, we
want to classify the state of the system as Normal, Scaling
attack or Ramp attack. Therefore, a multi classification must
be used. There are several methods for multi-class SVM,
but we apply the one-against-one method which is the most
efficient one based on [16]. In the one-against-one method,
k(k − 1)/2 classifiers are created: (w1)T φ(x) + b1 , ... ,(
wk(k−1)/2
)T
φ(x) + bk(k−1)/2 where k is the number of
classes. Each of these classifiers is trained on data from two
classes. For training data from the ith and the jth classes, the
following binary classification problem is solved:
min
wij ,bij ,ξij
1
2
(
wij
)T
wij + C
∑
t
ξijt(
wij
)T
φ (xt) + b
ij ≥ 1− ξijt , if yt = i(
wij
)T
φ (xt) + b
ij ≤ −1 + ξijt , if yt = j
ξijt ≥ 0
(12)
where φ is the function that maps training data xt to a higher
dimensional space to make data more separable and C is the
penalty parameter. By minimizing 12 (w
ij)Twij we maximize
2
‖wij‖ , which is the margin between two groups of data. When
data are not linear separable, there is a penalty term C
∑
t
ξijt
which can reduce the number of training errors. Actually
SVM searches for a balance between the regularization term
1
2 (w
ij)Twij and the training errors. After all k(k − 1)/2
classifiers are constructed, if sign
((
wij)Tφ(x) + bij
))
says
x is in the ith class, then the vote for the ith class is added
by one. Otherwise, the jth is increased by one. Then, x is
predicted as the class with the largest vote, and in case that
two classes have identical votes we select the one with the
smaller index.
In this paper, we propose using the residual signal as
xt for classification. Our motivation behind this decision is
that the residual signal is the result from the comparison
between the virtual version of the real output signal and the
estimated output. Hence, it shows abnormal behavior of the
system caused by the attacks, and based on how this abnormal
behavior is for each class, we can train a model for attack
classification. By applying Ramp attacks and Scaling attacks
and also considering the condition where there is no attack,
we can generate training data. Then, by labeling these data as
class 0 for Normal condition, class 1 for when there is Scaling
attack, and class 2 for when there is Ramp attack, and using
one-against-one method, we train a model for classification.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate our proposed approach in Matlab Simulink
[17], and in this section we describe our simulation model
and our experiments.
A. Process
In this paper, we use a ball and beam process. The ball and
beam system consists of a long beam which can be tilted by
an electric motor together with a ball rolling back and forth
on top of the beam. This system is open-loop unstable and
without a controller, it will swing to one side or the other, and
the ball will fall off the end of the beam.
To stabilize the ball, a control system that measures the
position of the ball and adjusts the beam accordingly must be
used. Our motivation for choosing the ball and beam system
is that it is an intrinsically unstable and time-critical system,
and any attack on this system can make it unstable quickly.
So, evaluating our proposed method on this system can prove
the effectiveness of it.
We simulate the ball and beam process using the standard
Lagrangian equations of motion for the ball based on [18]. In
our ball and beam system, the length of the beam is 1 meter.
Therefore, the allowable position for the ball is between 0 and
1, and if it goes outside this range, it will fall.
B. Digital Twin
Based on our prior work [10], we create a digital twin for
the ball and beam process in Matlab Simulink, which follows
its physical counterpart continuously. The network between
the physical domain and digital part (cloud), is simulated with
TrueTime [19]. We consider the network to be an Ethernet
with 2.5% packet loss probability and a 40 ms network delay.
C. Generating Attack Signals
An attack should have two main features. First, it should
cause the system to go to an unsafe state, and second, it should
not be easily detectable. Ramp attacks add a ramp signal to
the measurement signal and causes a change of the position
of the ball. If the slope of this ramp signal is high, it changes
the ball’s position quickly. However, such an attack will be
detected easily. So, the slope should be low and change the
ball’s position gradually in which case it is difficult to detect.
Therefore, we chose 0.5 meters, which is in the middle of
the beam, as a setpoint for the ball’s position in the controller,
and based on this, choosing 0 < λr ≤ 0.1 in (2) for the Ramp
attack is reasonable, since it will cause the ball to fall off and
it will be difficult to detect.
Scaling attacks are not so different in terms of how they
gradually can change the ball’s position. The only main
difference between Scaling attacks with different parameters
λs, see (1), is the consequence. If λs ≥ 15, it will cause
the ball to fall. However, choosing λs out of this range, only
causes the ball’s position to change on the beam, but it does
not cause it to fall and damage the system. So λs ≥ 15 is a
reasonable range for this type of attacks.
D. Evaluation of Attack Detection Method
The performance of the detection algorithm is evaluated by
measuring the time it takes to detect an attack and comparing
it with the time it takes the attack to drive the system to an
unsafe state. Here, for the ball and beam system, we compare
the time it takes our detection method to detect an attack with
the time that the attack takes to cause the ball to fall off.
For this evaluation, we apply Ramp attacks and Scaling
attacks with different parameters chosen from the selected
range to the measurement signal in the physical domain y.
Then, we record the time it takes to detect the attack and the
time it takes for the attack to cause the ball to fall, which is the
time it takes for the position of the ball to increase more than
1 meter or decrease less than 0 meters, and then we compare
these two time.
E. Evaluation of Attack Classification Method
To classify attacks and diagnose the type of an attack, as
it said before, we use residual signal r as training data for
obtaining a model using SVM, and this model will classify
new residual data as Normal, Scaling attack and Ramp attack.
To generate the training data, first, we run the simulation in
normal conditions when there are no attacks several times for
60 s and record the residual signal. Using this signal we create
a vector containing residual data related to a normal condition
that we label as class 0.
In the next step, we apply Scaling attacks with different λs
to the measurement signal y for 60 s, and for each λs, we
record the residual signal. In this way, we create a vector
containing residual data related to Scaling attacks that are
labelled as class 1.
The reason for applying attacks for 60 s is that we want to
diagnose the type of attack as soon as it occurs. So, we need
to cover different data related to the beginning of the attack,
and therefore 60 s is well enough for this purpose.
In the third step, we apply Ramp attacks with different λr to
the measurement signal y for 60 s and for each λr, we record
the residual signal. In this way, we create a vector containing
residual data related to Ramp attacks that are labelled as class
2. By using this training data with the SVM algorithm, we
obtain a model that should be able to determine the class of
new data.
The next step is to test this model using testing data.
To generate testing data for normal conditions, we run the
simulation without applying any attacks for 50 s and record
the residual signal as testing data. Testing data for Scaling
attacks are generated by applying Scaling attacks at time 30
s for 20 s with different λs that are chosen from the range
λs ≥ 15. Testing data for Ramp attacks are generated by
applying Ramp attacks at time 30 s for 20 s with different
λr that are selected from the range 0 < λr ≤ 0.1.
To evaluate the performance of the classification algorithm,
the class (label) of the testing data using the obtained SVM
model is determined. The accuracy is then calculated as
follows:
Accuracy =
The number of correctly predicted data
Total number of testing data
×100%
(13)
For each of λs and λr value and normal condition, the
generation and evaluation of testing data is repeated 15 times
and finally, the average accuracy for each of λs and λr value
and normal condition are calculated. Since the variability of
accuracy for each of these conditions is really low and we
have a quite narrow confidence interval, 15-time repetition is
well enough.
V. RESULTS
In this section, the results of the evaluation of attack
detection and classification algorithms are presented.
Fig. 2 shows the signal h and the ball’s position in the
presence of Ramp attack with λr = 0.04 which is started at
30 s. In this attack, the attacker gradually changes the ball’s
position and as it can be seen in Fig. 2, the attack causes
the ball to fall off at 42.52 s. However, our attack detection
algorithm can detect this attack at 31.29 s, which is well before
the ball falls off.
Fig. 3 shows the results for a Ramp attack which is started
at 30 s with different values of λr. All chosen λr are small
enough to make the attack difficult to detect. For each λr, the
blue line shows the time it takes for the ball to fall off, and
the red line shows the time it takes for our detection algorithm
to detect the attack. As can be seen in the figure, all attacks
can be detected before the attack can drive the system to an
unsafe state and cause the ball to fall.
Fig. 4 shows a similar evaluation for the Scaling attack with
different λs. As can be seen in the figure, although these
attacks can quickly affect the system and move the ball off
the beam, our proposed detection technique can detect them
in a timely manner and before the ball falls off.
To evaluate the classification method, as is said in the
previous section, we apply a Ramp attack at time 30 s for 20 s.
So, before 30 s, there are no attacks and the condition should
be classified as Normal. After 30 s, the condition should be
classified as a Ramp attack. By calculating the accuracy, the
algorithm can be evaluated.
Fig. 2. Detecting Ramp attack with λr = 0.04.
Table I shows the average accuracy for the Ramp at-
tack with different λr. As can be seen, the accuracy for
λr = 0.03, 0.04, 0.05 decreases. The reason for this result
is that, in this interval, there is an overlap with other classes.
However, for other λr the accuracy is more than 91%. Also
the total average accuracy of all cases is 91.27%, which is a
high accuracy that shows that our classification method can
recognize a Ramp attack.
Similar to the Ramp attack, we apply a Scaling attack to
the system at time 30 s for 20 s and calculate the accuracy.
Table II shows the average accuracy for the Scaling attack with
different λs. The accuracy is more than 98% for all cases, and
the total average accuracy is 98.96%, which proves that our
classification method can recognize a Scaling attack.
Finally, we evaluate the accuracy when there are no attacks.
Fig. 3. Detecting Ramp attacks.
Fig. 4. Detecting Scaling attacks.
In this case, all data should be classified as Normal. The
average accuracy for this condition equals 99.94% that shows
that our classification method can recognize Normal conditions
excellently.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Industrial control systems are increasingly being connected
to communications networks, which make them more vulner-
able to cyber attacks. Regarding this issue, in this paper, we
propose a digital twin based intrusion detection technique.
By deploying the intrusion detection system in the digital
domain, more advanced methods that require more computing
resources can be developed. Therefore, we have developed
and evaluated an intrusion detection mechanism for the digital
twin, which can both detect attacks and also classify the
type of attack. The intrusion detection mechanism uses a
combination of a Kalman filter to detect the attack, a particle
swarm optimization algorithm to estimate the noise, and
a support vector machine algorithm to classify the attack.
Through simulation studies in Matlab Simuling, we show that
TABLE I
ACCURACY OF RAMP ATTACK
CLASSIFICATION
Parameter λr Accuracy
0.01 91.42%
0.02 94.77%
0.03 83.97%
0.04 87.48%
0.05 89.88%
0.06 91.37%
0.07 92.44%
0.08 93.10%
0.09 93.85%
0.1 94.42%
TABLE II
ACCURACY OF SCALING ATTACK
CLASSIFICATION
Parameter λs Accuracy
20 98.97%
55 99.01%
100 99.03%
200 98.94%
300 98.95%
400 98.94%
500 98.93%
600 98.96%
700 98.93%
800 99.10%
900 98.92%
1000 98.95%
our detection method is highly effective to detect an attack
before the attack can drive the system to an unsafe state. Also,
we show that our classification approach can provide a high
accuracy when determining the types of attacks. Therefore,
our proposed approach can assist industrial control systems
with detecting cyber attacks before they cause damage and
also classify the type of attack, which will be of great benefit
when it comes to choosing the proper mitigation method for
each type of attack.
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